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INTRODUCTION
On March 11, 2016, we helped organize a symposium, titled
“Government Participation in Resolution Processes,” that explored whether
the recent trend of expanding governmental involvement in corporate
restructurings creates marketplace or other distortions—and then
considered possible solutions that might increase predictability and
certainty when the government does intervene in chapter 11 proceedings.
Beyond the considerable substantive contributions of the panels, the
symposium was notable for another reason: it was the inaugural event of
the University of Pennsylvania Institute for Restructuring Studies, also
referred to as the Penn Restructuring Institute.
As co-founders of the Institute, we are grateful to the Journal of
Business Law for devoting part of this issue to publishing the extended
presentations of several of the symposium’s panelists. We also appreciate
the Journal graciously providing us this space not only to preview those
articles, but also to explain the Institute’s background and goals. We hope
and believe the mission of the Penn Restructuring Institute will further the
educational objectives of the University of Pennsylvania generally, and the
* Partner, Restructuring Group, Kirkland & Ellis LLP. The views expressed herein are
solely my own and are not offered on behalf of my firm, any client, or other organization.
** S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
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Journal of Business Law specifically, and thus it seems fitting to use these
pages to formally introduce this project.
I.

THE INSTITUTE

First, our mission.
The Penn Restructuring Institute is a
multidisciplinary initiative intended to address timely corporate and
municipal insolvency issues and influence the public policy debate in a
manner that has practical application for investors, practitioners, regulators,
and academics—and to do so at a university that is both well known for
producing restructuring industry leaders and located within the financial,
legal, intellectual, and political nexus of New York and Washington, D.C.
Let’s unpack that. As we have taught and practiced restructuring law,
and through our writing, speaking, and testifying on related issues, we have
encountered a distinct disconnect among the various constituencies deeply
involved and interested in bankruptcy-related reforms. Put simply, there
are many influential actors in this space, but there is little connective tissue
between investors, practitioners, regulators, and the academic community.
Other than the American Bankruptcy Institute, which has its own
multifaceted approach to similar issues, there are few opportunities for the
different constituencies involved in restructuring issues to engage one
another directly.
This void is the primary impetus for the Penn Restructuring Institute.
There are many persons and entities separately pursuing important
restructuring initiatives. We hope to link these thought leaders, and to
facilitate a vigorous, informative, and nonpartisan debate about the most
consequential issues driving our profession.
Thus far, the Institute has enlisted the leadership of approximately
twenty-five of our colleagues, from varied private and public sectors of the
restructuring industry, to comprise a blue-ribbon Advisory Board that will
help guide our efforts.1 Beginning with this symposium, and continuing
with a series of further collaborative events and work products, the
Advisory Board will help, we hope, to generate a wide-ranging and
productive dialogue.
Why does this matter? There are several key reasons, with the
common theme that, even more than other areas of law, restructuring law
and practice develop within and across multiple realms.
While difficult to quantify precisely, the vast majority of corporate
restructurings are accomplished through out-of-court workouts, as opposed
1. Like the authors, all members of the Advisory Board are participating in the
Institute’s work in their individual capacities only, and not as representatives of their
respective institutions.
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to in-court chapter 11 cases. (This is especially true to the extent the
reorganization primarily involves financial deleveraging transactions,
which are more prevalent than operational overhauls.) To be sure, chapter
11 plays a role even here. A company’s ability to obtain sufficient creditor
consensus to avoid the need for a formal bankruptcy proceeding is
significantly affected by the parties’ understanding of the respective legal
benefits and risks to their position(s) in a chapter 11 case. But the reality is
that a huge amount of restructuring “law”—i.e., the dynamics governing
the art of the possible—advances outside of courtrooms and judicial
decisions.
Moreover, even chapter 11 itself evolves largely beyond the formal
legislative process.
While Congress does periodically amend the
Bankruptcy Code, those changes are often reactive—and at the margins.
During the long periods of relative legislative calm, bankruptcy practice
norms undergo gradual, yet often dramatic, changes. To cite one example,
section 363 of the Code was enacted to allow a debtor “after notice and a
hearing . . . [to] sell . . . other than in the ordinary course of business,
property of the estate. . . .”2 This provision originally was understood to
allow courts to authorize companies to sell discrete pieces of property (such
as an individual building or perhaps even a specific business unit). Over
time, however, section 363 was expanded to permit the sale of effectively
all of a debtor’s most valuable assets, frequently at the outset of a case
(with the sale proceeds and less desirable property left behind in the
chapter 11 estate for later distribution to creditors). Whatever one thinks of
this trend, the acceptance of so-called rapid section 363 sales for most or all
of a company has undeniably influenced the tactical options and bargaining
leverage among debtors and their secured and unsecured creditors. While
the text of the Bankruptcy Code itself may be largely static, its use and
interpretation is very dynamic.3
Finally, in the context of corporate reorganizations, the application of
law to facts is dissimilar from conventional commercial litigation. In the
latter, the key parties and the underlying evidence) often are largely fixed
(though subject to development through discovery). This means that if the
relevant law is well established, it should be a reasonably straightforward
2. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2015).
3. We acknowledge there are exceptions to our point about practice being the
principal source of change. In 2005, Congress amended section 365(d)(4) to require debtors
to assume or reject all real property leases within 120 days (subject to a 90-day extension).
This significantly curtailed the ability of retailers, with hundreds or perhaps thousands of
leased store locations, to undertake and accomplish orderly reorganizations—and resulted in
a spate of liquidations. We do not claim that legislative changes are irrelevant—it is that
they typically are infrequent, and piecemeal, but the evolution of chapter 11 practice under
the Code marches forward in the interim.
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exercise to determine a risk-adjusted litigation expected outcome. In a
restructuring, by contrast, certain facts may be settled, such as the textual
provisions of credit agreements and indentures (though their meanings are
often subject to debate). Yet even if the applicable law is clear, the
identities of the key parties may shift repeatedly, as certain investorcreditors trade in and out of various positions within the company’s capital
structure. Further, their motivations and actions will be impacted by the
market prices of the company’s debt and equity securities, which are
variable and subject to multiple exogenous factors, economic and
otherwise. Navigating a restructuring is akin to playing a game of chess
where the other side’s pieces (and those pieces’ abilities to make different
moves) may change constantly—often based on factors out of the parties’
control.
Although we have focused above on chapter 11 and its relationship to
out-of-court restructuring practice, other forms of insolvency resolution
proceedings—from bank failures to municipal bankruptcies—have many of
the same characteristics.
They are highly interdisciplinary and
continuously evolving.
Which brings us back to the mission of the Penn Restructuring
Institute. If one believes, as we do, that bankruptcy and other forms of
restructuring are critical tools for enhancing a functioning capitalist
economy, seeking to improve predictability and certainty—both for
companies and for their existing and potential stakeholders—is a
worthwhile endeavor. Events of the last few decades demonstrate that any
of America’s largest and most iconic corporations—and indeed, entire
crucial industries—may need to resort to chapter 11 or other formal or
informal restructuring frameworks. Given the dynamism and fluidity
described above, and the ever-expanding domain of restructuring law and
practice, there is an enormous need to bridge the informational gaps and
promote interaction between the many communities at the forefront of
these issues. We believe the timing is ideal, and the need is distinct, for an
initiative like the Penn Restructuring Institute.
II.

THE SYMPOSIUM

As we have already noted, the Institute’s inaugural symposium
focused on government participation in resolution processes. The first of
the two panels considered the government’s role as a “prepetition actor,”
that is, when the government provides start-up funds or other financing to
systemically important firms that have not yet defaulted; the second
emphasized government involvement as a “postpetition actor” after a
default has occurred. Speakers on the first panel included Professor Stuart
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Gilson of Harvard Business School; Professor Robert Rasmussen, professor
and immediate past dean of the University of Southern California Law
School; Jonathan Silver, managing partner of Tax Equity Advisors and a
former high level official on government financing in the Obama
administration; and Doug Schoen, a pollster who worked in the Clinton
administration. The second panel featured Patrick Bolton, a professor at
Columbia Business School; Charles Gray, Vice President of the Financial
Institution Supervisory Group at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York;
Marc Heimowitz, a portfolio manager at Claren Road Asset Management;
and Jim Millstein, founder of Millstein & Co. and former Chief
Restructuring Officer in the Obama Administration.
The question of whether and how the government should provide
rescue—or bailout—financing to troubled financial institutions figured
prominently on both panels. Given the continued relevance of and
controversy surrounding this issue, it seemed a fitting subject for more
extensive analysis. The two speakers who focused most directly on this
issue—Marc Heimowitz and Robert Rasmussen—each agreed to develop
their insights into formal articles for the purposes of the symposium. We
are pleased to say a few words about the articles that have emerged from
the earlier insights, and that appear in these pages.
In “Government as a Rescue Financer: Not Just a Private Lender,”
Heimowitz begins by comparing the role of the government as financer in
distressed situations to that of private lenders. As suppliers of needed
financing, both are in a position to control the troubled institutions and the
distribution of value among claimants. Yet, in sharp contrast to private
lenders, the government pursues noncommercial objectives as well as
commercial ones. The presence of these two factors—control and
noncommercial objectives—creates a great deal of uncertainty for creditors
and other market participants.
Can this uncertainty be reduced?
Heimowitz contends it can and outlines four principles to guide rescue
financing by the government in the future. The first is a very clever
strategy for market testing government rescue financing. In a true crisis,
private lenders are not a realistic alternative to government financing,
which makes it impossible to subject the government’s loan to a traditional
market test. In economic terms, “the slope of the supply curve for massive
rescue financing is nearly vertical at needed quantities in the short-term.”4
As an alternative, Heimowitz proposes that a slice of the loan—in an
amount that is “very large but possible”—be raised on the private markets,
and that the interest rate and other features of the private financing be used
4. Marc J. Heimowitz, Government as a Rescue Financer: Not Just a Private Lender,
19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 49 (forthcoming Fall 2016).
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to price the government’s rescue loan.5 The government would no longer
need to set the terms of the financing in a vacuum; it could harness the
information provided by the market. Heimowitz’s other three principles
are similarly insightful. We won’t summarize them here, lest we spoil the
treat of reading the article itself.
In drafting his article for the symposium, Rasmussen joined forces
with one of us, more than twenty years after we last co-authored an article.6
Like Heimowitz, Rasmussen and Skeel contend that bailouts will always be
with us, and thus that the crucial question is how best to manage them. In
“Government Intervention in an Economic Crisis,” Rasmussen and Skeel
divide the bailout process into three general stages: the decision to
intervene, implementation of the bailout, and exit.7 A key theme in their
analysis is political accountability. At the intervention stage, this requires
transparency and a clear articulation of reasons for intervening; with
implementation, political accountability calls for respect for priorities and
government involvement in the bailout recipient’s business only on issues
(such as removing managers or directors) that can easily be traced.
Rasmussen and Skeel further argue that the government should exit its
investment as soon as the crisis has been contained. Rasmussen and Skeel
also address the question whether government intervention should be
subject to judicial review. They conclude that it should, but that the scope
of review should be considerably narrower than it is for transactions
between private parties, in order to minimize interference with emergency
interventions.
Whether you agree with the conclusions reached in these articles—or
with either one, since the conclusions differ in important respects—we
hope they provide new insights into the government’s handling of rescue
financing.

5. Id. Heimowitz’s proposal bears an interesting resemblance to a strategy Mark Roe
advocated many years ago for determining the capital structure of a debtor in an ordinary
chapter 11 case. See Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate
Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 530 (1983) (suggesting that “the reorganization
value of the public firm could be found by selling a slice, say 10%, of new common stock
into the market, and extrapolating enterprise value from the sale price”).
6. Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Economic Analysis of Corporate
Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85 (1995).
7. Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., Government Intervention in an
Economic Crisis, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 7 (forthcoming Fall 2016).

